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1  |  INTRODUC TION
Giving a voice to patient experiences through the insights of prag-
matism will be explored through three phases. Firstly, recovery 
will be presented to highlight the significance of sharing personal 
experiences in mental health care. Thereafter, a sketch of pragma-
tism will be provided setting out three associated themes, namely 
pluralism, fallibilism and meliorism to add contextual meaning sur-
rounding how attentiveness towards patient experiences may be 
enlightened by pragmatism. The paper will then investigate these 
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Abstract
As	a	philosophical	position,	pragmatism	can	be	critiqued	to	distinguish	truth	only	with	
methods	that	bring	about	desired	results,	predominantly	with	scientific	enquiry.	The	
article hopes to dismiss this oversimplification and propose that within mental health 
nursing,	enquiry	enlightened	by	pragmatism	can	be	anchored	to	methods	helping	to	
tackle genuine human problems. Whilst pragmatists suggest one reality exists, fluctuat-
ing experiences and shifting beliefs about the world can inhabit within; hence, pragma-
tists propose reality has the potential to change. Moreover, pragmatism includes being 
cognisant of what works to whom reality concerns, making reality context-driven, with 
a view to understand how actions shape experiences so what is generated has useful-
ness. Hence, it somewhat follows pragmatism can inform mental health nursing, after 
all, nursing is a discipline of action, and awareness is needed in how actions produce 
experiences that patients find helpful. Given the principles of recovery are preferably 
adopted in mental health care, the paper will explore how pragmatism can help nurses 
move towards that goal; specifically, with patients voicing their experiences. This is 
because like pragmatism, recovery subscribes to hope that reality can progress, and 
through meaningful experiences and beliefs, patients have expertise about personal 
difficulties alongside how life may flourish, despite mental illness.
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themes amongst other related pragmatic ideas in how nurses can aid 
patients to share personal experiences that might lead to improving 
their mental health care.
1.1  |  Recovery
The notion of recovery from mental illness has increasingly become 
conceptualized not as an end point, achieved through a process 
of treatment and cessation of symptoms, but as the journey itself 
(Slade,	2009).	More	specifically,	recovery	is	understood	to	be	a	pro-
cess of moving towards experiencing personal satisfaction in life, as 
defined by the individual, and regardless of the potential continua-
tion	of	symptoms	of	 the	 illness	 (Gilburt	et	al.,	2013).	For	example,	
the development of attributes such as empowerment, hopefulness 
and self-determination over time, even in the context of continuing 
difficulties caused by the illness, can be understood to be ‘recovery’ 
(Okamoto	&	Tanigaki,	2018).
The assimilation of the aforementioned perspective, and 
adoption of ‘recovery-oriented practices’ are also increasingly 
prominent and widely accepted standards of care within the UK 
and international mental health services (Holley & Gillard, 2018; 
Mental	Health	Taskforce	to	the	NHS	in	England,	2016).	However,	
this	perspective	is	not	without	critique	and	has	a	complex	relation-
ship with the apparatus of biomedicine. Critics have specifically 
pointed to the difficulties some patients experience in embarking 
on any journey of development until acute illness is reduced—for 
example through the use of pharmacological treatments (Davidson 
&	Roe,	2007).	This	critique,	and	the	subsequent	debate,	has	given	
rise to a dichotomous conceptualization of recovery, whereby 
‘clinical recovery’, which is conceptualized as being led by clini-
cians, is seen as distinct from ‘personal recovery’ led by patients 
(Slade,	2009).
Mental	Health	Taskforce	to	the	NHS	in	England	(2016)	has	pro-
posed that, instead of a dichotomous conceptualization of recovery, 
mental health care could acknowledge and to some extent synthe-
size clinical and personal recovery. This vision is one of clinicians and 
patients collaborating, sharing expertise and an open-mindedness 
towards	patient	narratives	in	what	enriches	a	quality	of	life	(Mental	
Health	Taskforce	to	the	NHS	in	England,	2016).	The	latter	incorpo-
rates ‘expertise by experience’ which has seen growth as part of 
service delivery. Not only is the patient's voice pivotal with plan-
ning care but includes roles whereby those with lived experiences of 
mental illness offer consultation to services, or the employment of 
peer support workers who refer to their own experiences of mental 
ill	health	in	their	work	with	patients	(Mathison	et	al.,	2016).	In	light	
of these trends, there is increasing evidence that the building and 
maintaining of interpersonal connectivity can, even by itself, be an 
agent for change and advance a patient's hope in abilities to lay the 
foundations of their recovery. Hence, exploring nurses attending to 
personal experiences has significance, given the recovery journey 
can in part be conceived through perspectives in how patients en-
visage	the	world	they	inhabit	(Mathison	et	al.,	2016).
2  |  SKETCH OF PR AGMATISM
Pragmatism has a rich contested history with recent resurgence in its 
popularity consisting of voluminous journal articles, texts and book 
chapters	(Lamb,	2019).	The	philosophical	position	is	more	than	a	way	
to comprehend how truths are realized, it involves modes to think 
about the world surrounding ethics, education, politics and religion 
to	name	a	few	(Cojocaru,	2020;	Spencer,	2019).	Essentially	pragma-
tism	aims	to	understand	the	philosophical	enquiry	required	to	lessen	
social	 problems	 identified	 via	 human	 experiences	 (Schneiderhan,	
2013).
Pragmatism rejects some tenets of earlier philosophies, nota-
bly	Cartesian	Foundationalism	which	 assumes	unequivocal	 ‘innate	
ideas’	come	into	being	to	ascertain	what	is	true	(Margolis,	1977).	In	
contrast, pragmatists believe discussion and investigations are piv-
otal to envisage truths and discard errors; this allows for reality to 
be shaped via action to seek explanations contingent on context 
(Ormerod,	2006).	Hence,	rather	than	verify	fixed	beliefs	in	what	con-
stitutes reality, pragmatists are interested in how actions generate 
first-hand possibilities for people, with focus on ameliorating social 
problems in everyday life, as these are seen central to philosophical 
concerns	(Bernstein,	2013).
Pragmatism	originated	in	the	United	States	around	1870	traced	
to	the	literature	of	Charles	Sanders	Peirce,	who	somewhat	indebted	
to Kant, capitalized on the word ‘Praktische’ which touched upon 
the limitations of the mind when comprehending reality beyond 
human	senses	 (Ormerod,	2006).	 In	 the	early	20th	century,	writers	
such as William James and John Dewey saw pragmatism involve ex-
periences in ways to perceive the world, alongside collective beliefs 
in	what	the	world	entails	(Putman,	2017).	Although	James	gravitated	
towards embryonic ideas associated with pragmatism, whereby ex-
istence of a physical world could somewhat be independent of the 
mind; both authors agreed it was conceivable that experiences form 
part of reality, whilst reality has to have a degree of usefulness for it 
to	be	known	(Spencer,	2019).	For	this	reason,	actions	are	pivotal	so	
experiences can be shaped to have utility. Indeed pragmatism draws 
on the ancient Greek ‘pragma’ to literarily mean ‘action’ (James, 
1907:2010).	Dewey	(1896)	perhaps	encapsulated	this	best	with	a	cri-
tique	of	the	reflexive	arc	in	how	reactions	are	more	than	mechanistic	
processes made by corporeal functions. Instead, people are active 
players in determining their responses by bringing set behaviours 
and expectations drawn from previous learning, thus enables build-
ing upon previous experiences to make sense of current situations 
(Dewey,	1896).	Moreover,	learning	may	have	utility	by	how	it	relates	
to	the	person's	understanding	of	the	world,	suggesting	such	enquiry	
is likely to be meaningful and put to some use into how to react to 
things.
2.1  |  Pluralism
Pluralism	is	a	pragmatic	tenet	that	began	loosely	tied	to	a	critique	
of	Hegel's	 absolute	 idealism	 (Bernstein,	2016).	Broadly,	 absolute	
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idealism surrounds the proposition that all ideas can be catego-
rized under particular definitive concepts, and accordingly, James 
(1943)	proposed	it	can	stifle	the	conceptual	freedom	to	cultivate	
novel	 ideas.	 Although	 sometimes	 misconstrued	 that	 all	 claims	
about the world are valid to achieve a desired outcome, pragma-
tists suggest pluralism involves different apertures to view reality 
regardless if cut from the same cloth. It moves beyond dualistic 
reasoning that phenomena have opposites that conflict, notably 
the	 Cartesian	 mind–body	 split	 (Spencer,	 2019).	 Instead	 people	
have different experiences, and since every meaningful experi-
ence is one account where many are possible, a single account, 
by definition, cannot be the complete interpretation of a phenom-
enon	 (Misak,	2005).	Hence,	commonalities	are	 required	 to	move	
past	 dualistic	 arguments	 in	 what	 is	 right	 and	 wrong	 (Spencer,	
2019).
Given that pluralism can be explained through the existence of 
contrary ideas, debate exists if pragmatists can truly be pluralistic, 
after all, hope is held for some consensus between diverse ideas 
(Alisse	&	Aikin,	2005).	Nevertheless,	from	a	pragmatic	point	of	view	
hope need not be fulfilled, as hope towards something reflects a re-
ality in itself, and what is important is the continuity of collective 
discourse even without agreement. By way of democracy, Dewey 
looked to the ‘mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated 
experience’	 (Dewey,	1916:1985:93).	That	 is,	despite	disagreement,	
commonalities involving democratic ideas have been shaped since 
its inception and will continue to do so without necessarily achieving 
a	satisfactory	conclusion	(Caspary,	2018).	Moreover,	it	is	seemingly	
worthier to engage in discussion tolerating difficult and diverging 
views about democracy, as Dewy illustrates, the alternative could 
give rise to extremes, notably oppressive conformity or intimidation 
of	an	oppositional	struggle	(Dewey,	1916:1985;	Hildreth,	2009).
Another	approach	to	pluralism	involves	orientation	towards	fal-
libility, considering that humans make errors about beliefs, whilst 
discerning personal mistakes, helps to cast light on different points 
of	view	(Bernstein,	2005).	Hence,	through	open-mindedness,	people	
may uncover by what means pluralistic ideas may coexist, although 
contingent perhaps on navigating views that clash with their deeply 
held beliefs. In addition, the function of pluralism varies amongst 
pragmatists. It can be utilized to make some sense of reality, in that 
multiple beliefs exist and when verified by experiences, there is rea-
son to trust a particular belief relates to reality in some unspecified 
way	(Spencer,	2019).	Alternatively,	multiple	experiences	may	inter-
weave into a shifting pluralistic reality, and despite the richness of 
possibilities, experiences that evoke meaningfulness are likely to 
resonate, as they relate somehow to the world the person inhab-
its	 (Spencer,	2019).	What	 follows,	 is	 that	beliefs	have	utility	when	
confirmed by experience, whilst experiences may have momentary 
use, they are nevertheless built upon and progressed through dis-
covering	meaning	amidst	different	experiences.	Accordingly,	Dewey	
(1941)	employed	the	term	‘warranted	assertibility’	to	emphasize	this	
ever-evolving nature of human beliefs and experiences, in which 
open-mindedness lends itself to what has utility alongside tolerance, 
that	ideas	about	the	world	may	change	(Putnam,	1981).
2.2  |  Fallibilism
Whilst pluralism involves building upon different experiences to 
generate meaning, what is meaningful can also be open to scrutiny 
in	light	that	the	world	is	ever-changing	(Margolis,	1998).	Hence,	the	
aforementioned fallibility has place within pragmatism as a form of 
analysing meaning, for accordingly, there can be doubts about fixed 
conventions, and worldly accounts such as scientific and religious, 
may	be	imprecise	(Stuhr,	2000).	Furthermore,	since	experiences	are	
in a constant state of flux, existence cannot be seen in its entirety, 
and even if this were true, pragmatists doubt if such knowledge 
would	be	accurately	applied	(Seigfried,	1976).	Because	fallibilism	sits	
within	notions	of	an	 inconstant	world,	 it	has	been	critiqued	to	not	
pertain to any absolute truth. However, this is somewhat a misun-
derstanding, for what is kaleidoscopic are experiences, whilst beliefs 
are not obligated to change but alternatively, have the potential to 
do	so	(Spencer,	2019).
According	to	Peirce	(1877),	the	purpose	of	thought	is	to	produce	
beliefs,	which	materialize	as	truths	when	verified	by	experience.	As	
such, beliefs emulate tools to cohere human experience with the 
real world. This might contradict fallibility, in that beliefs are gen-
erated to reduce doubt whereby habits of action are produced. In 
one way this suggests reality becomes fixed if it were not for the 
caveat that experiences can also shape doubt about beliefs (Peirce, 
1877).	Thus,	pragmatists	recognize	the	power	of	enquiry	lies	not	in	
its ability to uncover absolute truths, but in its ability for experiences 
to falsify beliefs, and replace these with new ones that better ex-
plicate	earthly	phenomena	(Humphreys,	2019).	It	somewhat	follows	
therefore that doubts in a pragmatic vein are catalysts to engage in 
enquiry	when	beliefs	are	challenged.	However,	errors	might	be	sti-
fled to lessen internal conflict, and when not reconciled, shocks can 
arise	 in	 the	 form	of	 ‘reality	 checks’	 (Spencer,	2019).	Equally,	 there	
is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 despite	 enquiry,	 newly	 forged	 beliefs	will	 be	
infallible. Nevertheless, pragmatists see fallibilism in terms of dis-
cerning what might be inconstant truths, even without satisfactory 
outcome; punctuated with hope that progress is possible from the 
experiences	generated	from	enquiry	(Seigfried,	1976).
In	keeping	with	enquiry,	approaches	said	 to	exist	 in	 the	era	of	
Peirce	 include	deduction	and	 induction	 (Peirce,	1903/1998).	Much	
like Foundationalism, deduction involves the use of absolute truths 
(such	as	physical	laws)	to	determine	what	is	true	(Staat,	1993),	how-
ever, intractable ideas can limit options to discover new possibilities 
(Peirce,	1903:1998).	 In	contrast,	 induction	seeks	patterns	to	test	a	
hypothesis, to reveal if a belief has utility by the pattern resembling 
some	truth	 (Staat,	1993).	Nevertheless,	 inferred	patterns	might	be	
incorrect;	 hence,	 induction	 is	 not	 flawless	 (Peirce,	 1903:1998).	 In	
acknowledging people have rich beliefs about the world that stim-
ulate	 enquiry,	whilst	 experiences	 from	 enquiry	may	 challenge	 be-
liefs,	Peirce	suggested	a	third	mode	of	reasoning,	namely	Abduction	
(Peirce,	 1903:1998).	 Abduction	 recognizes	 hypotheses	 are	 fre-
quently	 shaped	 by	 experiences,	 and	 subsequently,	 open-minded-
ness helps facilitate unconventional thinking. This is to cultivate 
different understandings in how findings impact on beliefs, whilst 
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attempt is made to unravel experiential meanings derived from en-
quiry	(Burks,	1946).	Through	abduction,	beliefs	about	the	world	can	
be	questioned	via	findings,	yet	to	verify,	findings	need	to	cohere	in	
some	way	to	more	conclusive	beliefs	(Peirce,	1903:1998).	Hence,	ab-
duction is somewhat an interplay between deduction and induction. 
But rather than seek absolute truth or verify something is true, ab-
duction involves progressing insight into how truth might be realized 
within	the	parameters	of	existing	knowledge	(Spencer,	2019).	That	
is,	 it	 is	 likely	with	 further	 enquiry,	 different	 understanding	 of	 the	
phenomenon	may	materialize	(Burks,	1946).
2.3  |  Meliorism
In the midst of a pluralistic world, capacity exists to be receptive 
to genuine possibilities in which human action make differences, 
be	it	for	better	or	worse	(Stuhr,	2000).	 In	terms	of	 ‘worse’,	actions	
generate tragedy, whilst ‘better’ involves meliorism, a philosophical 
hopefulness that improvements are at least possible. This opposes 
notions surrounding optimism and pessimism. Whereas optimism is 
understood as improvements that materialize without action, pes-
simism	 views	 the	world	 beyond	 saving	 (James,	 1907:2010).	 Along	
these lines, reality is credited with innate emancipatory or constrain-
ing power rendering the need for human action impotent (James, 
1907:2010).	Alternatively,	meliorism	is	illuminated	by	hope	that	pro-
gress	is	possible	but	not	inevitable.	As	a	result,	purposeful	action	is	
undertaken in the spirit of hopefulness even without the guarantee 
of	 success	 (James,	1897:2017).	 Since	human	actions	 contribute	 to	
the plurality of the world, a suggestion is that a corollary of plural-
ism is humanism. Meliorism therefore holds pluralism and humanism 
somewhat together through the hope better lives can be cultivated 
via various human endeavours. This is whilst new ideas thrive in the 
fertile ground of fallibility, by transcending personal beliefs or in-
deed bias, to shape a reality that has utility beyond oneself (James, 
1897:2017).
Whilst Dewy envisaged civic action as the ethical heart in har-
nessing meliorism, Richard Rorty, another prominent pragmatist 
eschewed the idea meliorism aspires for something more than the 
reciprocity and solidarity that emerges out of having collective ex-
periences	 (Schneiderhan,	 2013).	 As	 such,	 hope	 has	 ability	 to	 bind	
people together. But social connectivity is not necessarily an end 
in itself; rather, it generates platforms which can empower demo-
cratic	enquiry	(Voparil,	2014).	Rorty	(1989)	points	out	that	given	the	
plurality within the world, the end point of actualizing an ideal dem-
ocratic	 process	 through	 enquiry	 is	 uncertain.	 However,	 this	 need	
not	paralyse	progress,	as	doubt	generates	questions	and	creativity	
to	utilize	democratic	practices	in	different	ways	and,	subsequently,	
may	reveal	alternative	routes	to	alleviate	social	concerns	via	enquiry	
(Voparil,	2014).
What is worked towards, according to Rorty, is a position of a 
Liberal	Ironist.	Liberalism	is	not	only	the	belief	in	autonomy	and	civil	
liberties but countering cruelties that impact on these principles 
(Rorty,	 1989).	Hence,	 the	 liberal	makes	 strong	 ethical	 judgements	
about certain types of behaviour, yet the ironist, involving pluralism 
and fallibility, recognizes others may have different opinions; thus, 
debate is one way of meeting a middle ground that might lead to 
improving	 life	 (Rorty,	 1989).	 In	 this	 sense,	 hope	 is	 transformative	
whilst utility is contingent on contextual conditions, alongside form-
ing	 meaningful	 experiences	 between	 people	 (Curtis,	 2016).	 Hope	
could also be seen as an orientation that despite its ambiguity, things 
move into a general direction that coheres to inner beliefs and de-
sires, driven by the pragmatic notion that everyone has a purposeful 
place	in	society	(Ormerod,	2006).	To	that	end,	pragmatists	propose	
all voices, if not forcefully opposed to others, have the right to be 
heard. The latter, in particular, resonates to recovery, given that care 
informed by patient experiences is a significant part of its practices. 
Subsequently,	 to	 further	understand	the	relevance	of	pragmatism,	
the ways mental health nurses may enable the patient's voice along-
side the benefits to care will be explored drawing on the aforemen-
tioned pragmatic themes.
3  |  PATIENT E XPERIENCES
Despite recovery-oriented practices subscribing to patient and 
nurse collaboration, tensions can exist surrounding who possesses 
expert knowledge. The value of expertise may gravitate towards 
professional credentials and grasp of particular research such as in-
volving	experimental	or	observational	designs	(Davies	et	al.,	2006).	
Whilst these proficiencies inform care, personal accounts in what is 
helpful risk being relegated to the periphery of legitimate knowledge 
(Noorani,	2013).	This	is	seen	further	with	the	classification	of	mental	
disorder, whereby value can be placed on hyponarrativity, in that life 
experiences are of less importance than the objective aridity of cat-
egorizing	symptoms	(Hauptman,	2015).	Such	detachment	might	be	
necessary to isolate symptoms from conjecture to produce impartial 
findings	about	 treatments	 (Hoffman,	2015).	Moreover,	orientation	
of patients can be hindered by mental health difficulties, suggesting 
issues, notably with perceptions of reality and ownership of behav-
iours,	can	 impact	on	personal	experiences	 (Tekin,	2014).	However,	
given the pragmatic vein surrounding plurality, this could have bear-
ing to individuals living through mental disorders. Hence, it is pos-
sible there is little generality in how mental illnesses are personally 
experienced, whilst varying degrees of disorientation can occur that 
change	overtime	(Davies	et	al.,	2006).	In	light	of	these	conceivable	
temporal or situational states of being, there does appear some 
space for meliorism, particularly in the hope that by listening to per-
sonal experiences, possibilities arise in how to help patients lessen 
difficulties	 and	 improve	 their	 recovery	 (Llewellyn-Beardsley	 et	 al.,	
2019).
Through	narrative	enquiry,	pragmatists	have	hope	that	dialogical	
spaces open to reveal the social difficulties a person is experienc-
ing	 (Addams,	 1963).	Narrative	 enquiry	 is	 a	way	 of	 understanding,	
organizing and communicating experiences, and in part surrounds 
the act of storytelling, as the world is ‘full of partial stories that run 
parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times’ (James, 
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1907:2010:71).	Within	enquiry	relating	to	pragmatism,	it	can	include	
living via our stories, telling stories of experiences, and modifying 
stories by retelling and reliving the story (Bourbonnais & Michaud, 
2018).	Storytelling	also	entails	a	dialogical	co-construction	between	
people, in which a narrative unfolds yielding possible opportunity 
(Colapietro,	2013).	That	 is,	a	 terrain	consisting	of	 the	patient's	dif-
ficulties might be narrated, and as such, features within the terrain 
might be explored to ameliorate difficulties and aid life (Bergner, 
2007).	However,	mental	illness	can	impact	on	shared	notions	about	
ordinary living between the patient and nurse. Nevertheless, explor-
ing how narratives resonate to the world of the patient despite ap-
pearing unfamiliar may highlight clues in what aids recovery. Through 
particular care practices such as active listening and participation, it 
can bring about what pragmatists call the method of ‘sympathetic 
interpretation’	 (Addams,	1895/2001).	The	latter	specifies	that	 ‘one	
must really engage the people involved in the problematic situation 
at hand and work to construct a narrative that gives meaning to 
the experience and proposes ways of making the situation better’ 
(McKenna	&	Pratt,	2015:	50).
3.1  |  Attentiveness
Given sufficient freedoms, pragmatists hold that individuals pos-
sess the potential for personal growth. Recovery, like pragmatic 
ideas	 about	 channelling	 democratic	 enquiry,	 posits	 interpersonal	
relationships	are	key	to	unlock	human	potential	(Moen,	2015).	This	
is important, as a nurse and patient can have individuality and/or 
uniqueness	 between	 them	 making	 communication	 necessary	 to	
build understanding. With patients having freedom to share their 
voice, the resultant social connectivity can be fulfilling, whilst appre-
ciation for different views involving the reality of the patient may aid 
enquiry	but	also	a	sense	of	belonging	(Baker,	1992).	The	latter	is	of	
significance since social isolation impacts on mental health whereas 
belonging, involving occupation of valued social roles, exercise of 
personal authority, and development of a positive self-identity, con-
tributes	to	life	being	more	meaningful	(Barut	et	al.,	2016).
An	open-mindedness	with	possibility	 that	 fallibility	 and	plural-
ity exist in how narratives are comprehended, may aid collaboration 
(Song,	2018);	 that	 is,	 through	an	abductive	vein,	 nurses	 can	come	
with knowledge about illnesses and associated difficulties. In addi-
tion, knowledge is also held in what might be generally helpful to 
lessen	mental	distress	(Mirza	et	al.,	2014).	However,	this	knowledge	
has utility insofar it has meaningfulness to personal experiences; 
hence,	 life	 experiences	 are	 required	 to	be	understood	 so	patients	
can see the utility of care by how it relates to what they see as 
meaningful	(Ottens	et	al.,	1995).	Along	these	lines,	what	has	utility	
surrounds conversations that resonate with the patient's life, and 
nurses being prepared that it might not, may help to explore other 
meaningful	options	(Mirza	et	al.,	2014).
Being	that	Dewey	(1910)	proposed	experiences	and	self-aware-
ness	 form	part	of	 a	method	of	 enquiry,	 nurses	 allowing	 for	doubt	
within their insights about patient experiences might promote 
care	opportunities	 (Calcaterra,	2017).	Rather	than	the	nurse	being	
the all-knowing expert, doubt illustrates the provisional nature of 
knowledge. Indeed, experiences might be better understood by cul-
tivating ‘…deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested 
beliefs from mere assertions…[and] develop a lively, sincere, and 
open-minded	preference	for	conclusions…’	(Dewey,	1910:28).	An	ex-
tensive body of research exists involving preconceived ideas about 
diagnoses like borderline personality disorder and schizophrenia, 
largely through examining the beliefs of mental health profession-
als	(Merino	et	al.,	2018).	Hence,	awareness	that	such	ideas	could	be	
fallible, whilst attentiveness involving pluralism insomuch there are 
many ways to improve life, might expand recovery opportunities 
(Kaag,	2010).
In the context of the aforementioned, notions involving absolute 
idealism in psychiatry are to an extent opposed. Rather than the dis-
order being the sole cause for all problems, patients might find utility 
in care when there is recognition from nurses that some difficulties 
derive	from	beyond	the	condition	itself	(Oulis,	2008).	For	example,	
stigma associated with mental illness can impact on mental health 
(Nowak,	 2019).	Moreover,	 what	 improves	 life	might	 include	more	
than reducing the symptoms of the illness, particularly as attention 
on the patient's family and relationships, occupation, social contacts 
and lessening financial problems can influence having a meaningful 
life	(Slade,	2009).	Given	what	has	utility	is	somewhat	curated	via	be-
liefs about the world; an open-mindedness involving plurality and 
fallibility may elicit narratives involving such beliefs, whereby nurses 
accommodate different perspectives, and thus, shape dialogue that 
patients	 perhaps	 find	meaningful	 (Calcaterra,	 2017;	Capps,	 2019).	
However, just as it is impossible to understand all our inner thoughts, 
likewise part of the patient's private life will remain impenetrable, re-
quiring	an	acceptance	that	‘in	every	being	that	is	real	there	is	some-
thing external to, and sacred from, the grasp of every other’ (James, 
1897:2017:	111).
3.2  |  Tolerance
Tolerance could be seen as the interplay between plurality and falli-
bility in shaping understanding in what is difficult and helpful for pa-
tients	(Holma,	2012).	It	is	a	pragmatic	response	to	the	genuine	need	
for	people	to	coexist	despite	having	disagreements.	Acceptance	of	
others	 in	 some	 form	 is	 required,	 as	 pragmatists	 propose	 diversity	
cannot be suppressed by asymmetrical political power or philo-
sophical	arguments	(Horton,	1987).	Whilst	there	are	disagreements	
in what constitutes authority of some beliefs, opposition is unlikely 
to result in disputed opinions being banished from the reality of 
others. In a pragmatic vein, tolerance draws not on metaphysical or 
moral positions owing to disagreements between theories. In con-
trast, pragmatists dispute the way intolerance can materialize out 
of	 conflicts	 about	 which	 theory	 is	 correct	 (Misak,	 2000).	 Hence,	
pragmatists embody that human diversity is simply part of living ob-
ligating a degree of tolerance, as in general, humans have need for 
free	and	peaceful	coexistence	(Grčić,	2000).	Essentially,	tolerance	is	
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a pragmatic political value, in which pluralism and fallibility broaden 
our	window	of	perception	and	expand	the	parameters	of	enquiry	in	
a	bid	to	build	cooperation	amongst	people	(Fiala,	2002).
As	 pragmatists	 suggest	 some	 thoughts	 are	 impenetrable	 to	
others	 (James,	1897:2017);	 tolerance	 could	be	viewed	 in	 terms	of	
leaving	 people	 alone	when	not	 causing	 harm	 (Fiala,	 2002).	Whilst	
non-interference can be well-intentioned, pragmatists such as 
Addams	and	Rorty	see	tolerance	more	with	connecting	with	others	
to	 enrich	 understanding	 and	 revise	 personal	 biases	 (Miller,	 2003).	
Indeed, attending to experiences appears a condition for care, as 
to avoid experiences that convey mental distress is likely unethical. 
Concerning nursing, this appears to involve unprejudicedness and 
relational empathy, with efforts to build a sense of connection to 
see where the other is coming from and to put oneself in the shoes 
of	the	patient	(Brown	et	al.,	2014).	Each	inner	world	contains	within	
it, a portion of truth, relevant to the patient's life despite mental 
health difficulties, and wrestling to understand these can yield ethi-
cal knowledge in how nurses may aid recovery. That is, nurses learn 
from interactions with patients in how to expand a repertoire in what 
helps, whereby choices are made contingent on what emerges out 
of	the	relationship	(Wiley,	2006).	This	might	 involve	the	pragmatic	
notion of ‘choice-inclusive facts’, for despite some commonalities 
surrounding human needs, the extent care is informed by choices 
relevant to the patient's world will shape the perceived utility of the 
nursing	intervention	(Lachs,	1995).
3.3  |  Interpersonal relationships and self-
cultivation
Personal fulfilment can be worked towards by patients having ac-
tive involvement in their care. This might arise from the interper-
sonal relationship and may ameliorate the lack of social participation 
that	 some	 people	 encounter	 living	 with	 mental	 illness	 (Simpson	
et	 al.,	 2016).	 Essentially	 the	 relationship	 gives	 feedback	 that	 the	
personal experiences of the patient matter. The implications are 
what is meaningful is interpreted and internalized by the patient 
founded on and formed via the intersubjective relation with the 
nurse,	and	for	Dewey,	the	focus	is	on	context	(Anderson,	2018).	This	
is to highlight personal problems and helpful ways forward, as these 
are things inherent to the patient's life and intrinsically relates to 
their	 way	 of	 being	 and	 thinking	 (Pappas,	 2015).	 Through	 related-
ness as fellow human beings, reciprocation can materialize, involv-
ing perhaps satisfaction for the nurse with helping another whilst 
the patient may build or recuperate a sense of self lost possibly 
to	mental	 illness	 (Sandhu	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 The	 patient	 is	 also	 able	 to	
evolve their self-worth, as the self is experienced in relation to an-
other, that is the nurse, to understand the self, giving a microcosm 
example of their potential to have a purposeful role within social 
situations	(Calcaterra,	2017).	In	this	way,	it	furthers	interconnection	
amongst things rather than dualism, as pragmatists see continuity 
between	personal	growth	and	a	flourishing	society	(Uffelman,	2011).	
Moreover, care resonates with pragmatic notions surrounding 
self-cultivation whereby self-determination is developed, owing to 
synchronizing care to what is meaningful to the patient, notably in 
what	constitutes	helpfulness	(Bachkirova	&	Borrington,	2019).
Self-cultivation	 seemingly	 has	 strong	 attachment	 to	 recovery	
in which meliorism also presents itself. This involves patients hav-
ing an internal shift from hopelessness to hope, by having an active 
voice within their care, notably drawing on personal experiences to 
inform	decision-making	 and	 care	 planning	 (McKenna	 et	 al.,	 2014).	
Hence, the patient begins to hold hope, in their own potential and 
strengths	 to	 develop	 a	 life	 that	 is	 meaningful	 (Bird	 et	 al.,	 2014).	
According	to	Dewey	(1910),	alienation	that	might	befall	people,	for	
example with mental illness, are problems which philosophy should 
direct its efforts, and interconnectivity, may to a degree lessen such 
issues	 (McDermott,	 1983).	 Subsequently,	 catalysts	 for	 self-culti-
vation, in which hope is developed in abilities to have a better life 
may derive from the openness of communication and interchange of 
ideas	within	meaningful	relationships	(Knee	et	al.,	2003).	As	Dewey	
and	Tufts	(1932:	383)	wrote,	‘In	the	degree	in	which	there	is	genu-
ine mutual give and take [views expressed] are seen in a new light, 
deepened and extended in meaning, and there is the enjoyment 
of enlargement of experience, [and] of growth of capacity”. James 
(1900)	 portrayed	 this	 perhaps	 best	 in	 the	 form	 of	 two	 questions	
going to the heart of what pragmatists might call the “personal con-
cept	of	justice’	(Rondel,	2017:315).	The	first	question	asks	what	life	
is like, when not receiving treatment one is entitled to. This involves 
paying attention to those who live through difficulties that a person, 
such	as	a	nurse,	is	committed	to	address	(Rondel,	2017).	The	second	
question	surrounds	actions	undertaken,	when	committed	to	justice	
for	all	individuals	(Rondel,	2017).	This	might	start	with	introspection;	
building open-mindedness and active tolerance towards others, de-
spite the possibility that conflicting views about the world can be 
held	by	people	(Stuhr,	2000).
4  |  CONCLUSION
The paper has to some extent shown that rather than allowing for 
virtually every idea to bring about anticipated results, pragmatism 
can	 involve	specific	methods	to	 further	open-minded	enquiry	 into	
the genuine needs of people. In particular, these methods resonate 
with engaging people with mental health difficulties with a view to 
cultivate	their	recovery.	Despite	critique	that	knowledge	requires	to	
be tested against some objective truth, pragmatists do believe in the 
stability	of	beliefs	surrounding	the	world,	yet	beliefs	can	equally	be	
open to revision. This is markedly in the context of developing self-
awareness about the plights of others and what aids their life, after 
all, it is doubtful, and there can be a complete knowledge of all per-
sonal needs which might lessen mental health difficulties.
Rather than adopt a relativist position in that multiple reali-
ties exist; pragmatism suggests different perspectives can be held 
within one ever-evolving world. Hence, whilst there are commonal-
ities with approaches that ameliorate mental distress, experiences 
may also raise doubt about their utility. Moreover, mental illness is 
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somewhat open to subjectivity despite a biomedical background in 
what constitutes and alleviates mental ill health. That is not to sug-
gest this background is banished in light of different mental health 
experiences.	Alternatively,	and	similarly	to	pragmatism,	practices	
relating to recovery support the coexistence of different under-
standings, specifically clinical and personal perspectives involving 
mental illness. This is with a caveat that efforts are made to align 
care to what is meaningful to the patient. If not, it seems futile 
that treatment is endured only for it to be likely rejected once the 
person is not under mental health services. It is hoped therefore 
this paper has enlightened in how pragmatism can inform about 
attending to patient experiences, particularly surrounding toler-
ance and open-mindedness. Notwithstanding the impact from 
mental illness, expressed experiences may still highlight ways to 
enrich	recovery.	At	the	very	least,	the	conversations	that	arise	are	
potentially therapeutic, even with the presence of different worl-
dviews, which notably can, but is not limited to, the veracity about 
the mental illness itself.
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